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by-case basis, using a due process approach, will depend in large part
upon a decision of the Supreme Court which may be forthcoming in
this area. 5
The importance of maintaining an overview with respect to these and
other recent developments in criminal law is apparent, and applies
equally to those in all quarters of our profession. The judiciary must
have a strong sense of precedent to provide the necessary continuity in
its decisions. This continuity will then be translated into a rational and
orderly evolution of case law which forms the heart of our legal system.
Similarly, this sense of perspective is a requisite for the practitioner
since, in theory, he must be constructively innovative and act as a guide
for the court.
One meaningful way to develop such a frame of reference is to
examine recent decisions of the appellate court, to dissect the changes
which -have occurred, and to ponder dictum which may foreshadow
change in the future. A circuit review such as the one that follows
serves that purpose and will undoubtedly also serve as a source of
reference for practitioners, lower courts, professors, and students alike.
II. BORDER SEARCHES:
UNITED STATES V. MARTINEZ-FuERTE*

The problems associated with the influx of illegal aliens and contraband into the United States have had a substantial impact on the
activities of the United States Border Patrol.' Attempts by the Border
Patrol to meet these problems through the use of roving patrols and
fixed and temporary checkpoints away from the border have been
seriously curtailed by a series of Supreme Court and federal appellate
court opinions which have limited the Patrol's power to conduct warrantless stops and searches without probable cause or "founded suspicion."'
25. United States v. Mandujano, 496 F.2d 1050 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 420
U.S. 989 (1975).
1. For a discussion of the economic and sociological aspects of this problem see
United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398, 402-08 (S.D. Cal. 1973). For a discussion of
the broad congressional power over immigration see Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S.
753, 765-67 (1972).
2. The notion of "founded suspicion" was first articulated by the Ninth Circuit in
Wilson v. Porter, 361 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1966), where the court stated:
[D]ue regard for the practical necessities of effective law enforcement requires that
the validity of brief, informal detention be recognized whenever it appears from the
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In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,3 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
further limited the Patrol's power by holding that an area search warrant

would not make lawful an otherwise unreasonable search.
The area warrant in Martinez-Fuerte authorized Patrol agents to stop
all cars passing through fixed immigration checkpoints and to detain

some of those stopped for questioning. The vehicles which were detained for questioning were selected solely on the agent's discretion,
without the need for first establishing the existence of probable cause or
founded suspicion.4 In finding the warrant invalid, the court expressly
rejected a suggestion by Justice Powell, advanced in his concurring

opinion in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,5 that an appropriately
drawn area search warrant could justify stops made by roving Border

Patrol agents.6 The court also rejected a corollary argument put forth
by the Government that a validly drawn warrant could justify stops and
searches at a fixed checkpoint away from the border. 7
In Almeida-Sanchez, the Supreme Court held that roving patrol
searches by units of the Border Patrol cannot be conducted if the agent

has neither a warrant nor probable causes to stop the particular vehicle
in question. 9 In a later case, United States v. Ortiz,10 the same requiretotality of the circumstances that the detaining officers could have had reasonable
grounds for their action. A founded suspicion is all that is necessary, some basis
from which the court can determine that the detention was not arbitrary or harassing.
Id. at 415. In Wilson, although the defendant had violated no traffic laws, he was
stopped after officers had repeatedly noticed him driving very slowly on the same
streets in the early hours of the morning. The standard of "founded suspicion" has been
used often by the Ninth Circuit. See, e.g., United States v. Rocha-Lopez, 527 F.2d 476
(9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Larios-Montes, 500 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Jaime-Barrios, 494 F.2d 455 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 972 (1974);
United States v. Ward, 488 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Bugarin-Casas,
484 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1136 (1974).
3. 514 F.2d 308 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 35 (1975).
4. Id. at 312.
5. 413 U.S. 266, 275 (1973) (Powell, I., concurring).
6. 514 F.2d at 316, 318.
7. Id. at 318.
8. Traditionally, probable cause is said to exist when
the facts and circumstances within [the officers'] knowledge and of which they had
reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man
of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949), citing Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 162 (1924).
9. 413 U.S. at 274-75, quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 (1924).
Almeida-Sanchez and its effect on the operation of border inspections has recently been
reviewed by a number of commentators. See generally Note, The Aftermath of
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States: Automobile Searches for Aliens Take on a New
Look, 10 CALni.WEST. L. REv. 657 (1974); The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HAv.
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ments were held to apply to a search conducted at a fixed Border Patrol
2 the Court
checkpoint. 1 ' Further, in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,"
held that
[ffor the same reasons that the Fourth Amendment forbids stopping vehicles at random to inquire if they are carrying aliens who are illegally
in the country, it also forbids stopping or detaining persons for questioning about their citizenship on less than a reasonable suspicion that they
may be aliens.1 3

As a result of Almeida-Sanchez and its progeny, a rule has evolved4
requiring probable cause, founded suspicion, or a warrant for any stop'
or search' 5 away from the border or its "functional equivalent."10
L. Rnv. 1, 196 (1973); Note, Border SearchesRevisited: Tile ConstitutionalPropriety of
Fixed and Temporary Checkpoint Searches, 2 HASTINGS CON. L.Q. 251 (1975); Note,
Area Search Warrantsin Border Zones: Almeida-Sanchez and Camara,84 YALE L.J. 355
(1974).
10. 422 U.S. 891 (1975).
11. Id. at 896-97.
12. 422 U.S. 873 (1975). Brignoni-Poncewas decided the same day as Ortiz, as was
Bowen v. United States, 422 U.S. 916 (1975), which held that the principles of AlmeidaSanchez were not to apply retroactively to invalidate searches that occurred prior to the
date of that decision. To the same effect is United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531
(1975). For a discussion of the retroactivity of Almeida-Sanchez see Note, Application
of the "New Rule" Threshold Test Before Determining the Retroactivity of AlmeidaSanchez, 53 TExAs L. REV. 586 (1975).
13. 422 U.S. at 884.
14. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); United States v.
Juarez-Rodriguez, 498 F.2d 7 (9th Cir. 1974). It should be noted, however, that the
Supreme Court has yet to decide the constitutionality of a stop at a fixed checkpoint
where there is no probable cause or warrant to make the stop. Presumably
Martinez-Fuerte gives the Court the opportunity to decide this issue. See notes 72-73,
83-84 infra and accompanying text.
15. See Bowen v. United States, 422 U.S. 916 (1975); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S.
892 (1975); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973). Under the fourth
amendment, the general rule is that a warrant is required for a search unless the
circumstances of the case fall within one of the narrowly defined exceptions to the
warrant requirement. The well-recognized exceptions are: evidence within officers' plain
view (Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971)); consent by defendant to a
search (United States v. Watson, 96 S.Ct. 821 (1976); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218 (1973)); and search incident to lawful arrest (Chimel 'v. California, 395 U.S.
958 (1968)). However, it has been stated that none of the exceptions to the warrant
requirement applies to roving automobile searches in border areas. Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U.S. 266, 282 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
16. The same degree of governmental intrusion allowed during a search at the physical
border is also allowed at certain locations inland from the border where the first check of
persons and materials may occur after entry into the United States. As the Court stated
in Almeida-Sanchez:
Whatever the permissible scope of intrusiveness of a routine border search might be,
searches of this kind may in certain circumstances take place not only at the border
itself, but at its functional equivalents as well.
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A.

Area Search Warrants

Justice Powell, concurring in Almeida-Sanchez, recognized the conffict between the Government's legitimate interests in enforcing the
immigration laws along "thousands of miles of open border,"
and an
413 U.S. at 272. The Court illustrated functional equivalents by reference to a search at
"an established station near the border, at a point marking the confluence of two or more
roads that extend from the border," and a "search of passengers and cargo of an airplane
arriving at a St. Louis airport after a nonstop flight from Mexico City." Id. at 273. As
to the latter concept, given the standard of Klein v. United States, 472 F.2d 847, 849
(9th Cir. 1973), that probable cause is presumed from the fact of entry into the United
States, airport searches of passengers who arrive on a nonstop flight are justified, but not
searches of others in the same area who were not on a nonstop flight. Similarly, the
search of mail arriving at points of entry within the United States has been justified as a
border search. United States v. Bardlift, 514 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir. 1975).
However, the "established station near the border" concept is somewhat more difficult
to apply, as evidenced by some disagreement between the circuits as to whether the
Border Patrol's fixed checkpoints are functional equivalents of the border.
In United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398 (S.D. Cal. 1973), the district court had
held that the San Clemente checkpoint and other fixed checkpoints in California were the
functional equivalent of the border. However, as stated by the court in Martinez-Fuerte,
the Ninth Circuit "[has] since overruled that conclusion." 514 F.2d at 315, citing
United States v. Morgan, 501 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir. 1974) (San Clemente checkpoint not
a functional equivalent of border); United States v. Bowen, 500 F.2d 960 (9th Cir.
1974), affd, 422 U.S. 916 (1975) (State Highway 86 checkpoint); United States v.
Esquer-Rivera, 500 F.2d 313 (9th Cir. 1974) (Ocotillo, California checkpoint). See also
United States v. Heinrich, 499 F.2d 95 (9th Cir. 1974) (Temecula checkpoint).
The Fifth Circuit, however, has decided that the Sierra Blanca, Texas, fixed checkpoint, whose operations are similar to those of the San Clemente and Temecula
checkpoints, is the functional equivalent of the border. United States v. Hart, 506 F.2d
887 (5th Cir. 1975). In Hart, the court, while noting it had never held unconstitutional
a search occurring at a permanent checkpoint, stated that basic to the determination of
what is a functional equivalent is the function, location, and permanence of the station.
Id. at 889.
The La Gloria temporary checkpoint, located in a rural area near El Paso, Texas, 35
miles from the border, was deemed the functional equivalent of the border. United
States v. Fuentes, 379 F. Supp. 1145 (S.D. Tex. 1974). The judge, in determining
whether the search conducted at the checkpoint was the functional equivalent of a border
search, looked at the particular features of the area, including the long stretch of
unpatrolled, unsettled border, the practice of aliens crossing the border with temporary
border crossing cards (restricting them to an area 25 miles from the border), and the
attempted migration north into the United States.
Subsequent to Hart and Fuentes, however, the Supreme Court in Ortiz announced the
requirement of probable cause for a search conducted at the San Clemente checkpoint
(422 U.S. at 898), thereby ratifying the Ninth Circuit's previous determination
that a search at that checkpoint was not the functional equivalent of a border search.
Additionally, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Ninth Circuit in United
States v. Bowen, 500 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1974), which had held that the fixed checkpoint
on State Highway 86 was not the functional equivalent of the border. The Supreme
Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's decision without questioning the circuit court's
determination that the fixed checkpoint was not a functional equivalent of the border.
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In order to reconcile

this conflict, Powell suggested that the activities of the Border Patrol

may be validated by an area warrant similar to that postulated in Camara v. Municipal Court.'8 Under such a warrant, the traditional def-

inition of probable cause is seemingly transformed: "If a valid public
interest justifies the intrusion contemplated, then there is probable
cause to issue a suitably restricted search warrant."' 9
The majority specifically rejected the notion that Camara and other
administrative inspection decisions2 ° supported the stop and search in
Almeida-Sanchez.21 Yet Justice Powell thought that the essential fac-

tors justifying a Camara-type area warrant were present in situations
involving roving Border Patrol searches.

First, consistent judicial ap-

proval of the search procedure 2 was provided on the appellate level
as to roving border patrols. Second, the absence of any reasonable alternative to Border Patrol checks 23 had been held to be a sufficient reason to validate such checks as constitutionally permissible. 24 Finally,
the relatively "modest intrusion" occasioned by a stop and searoh of a
vehicle on the highway, which is said to be less intrusive than a search of
a person or building, 25 was analogous to the administrative search of
Bowen v. United States, 422 U.S. 916 (1975). The aspect of permanence, discussed by
the Fifth Circuit in Hart,would thus seem irrelevant in determining what is a "functional equivalent."
17. 413 U.S. at 275.
18. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
19. Id. at 539. For a discussion of the administrative warrant and the issues
associated with its use see Note, Administrative Search Warrants, 58 MnqN. L. REV.
607 (1974).
20. See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972); Colonnade Catering Corp. v.
United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
21. 413 U.S. at 270-72.
22. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967).
23. 413 U.S. at 279.
24. See, e.g., United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398 (S.D. Cal. 1973).
25. 413 U.S. at 279, citing Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48 (1970). Justice
Powell seemingly ignored the specific requirement of Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132 (1925), that probable cause exist before a search of a particular vehicle may take
place; however, his opinions in related cases demonstrate that probable cause must exist.
But he has also indicated that in light of the rationale of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968), a stop may be justified on grounds less compelling than would justify a search.
Powell has reasoned that because the degree of intrusiveness is slight, the stop of vehicles
may be constitutionally permissible where the officer has a reasonable suspicion to
believe that the vehicle is carrying illegal aliens. For example, he stated in BrignonlPonce that
because of the importance of the governmental interest at stake, the minimal intrusion of a brief stop, and the absence of practical alternatives for policing the border,
. . .when an officer's observations lead him reasonably to suspect that a particular
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Camara.2 6

Powell then set forth the grounds upon which an area warrant for
roving Border Patrol searches might be issued."
He noted that the
requirements for an area warrant in Camara were "generally unstructured. 28 He did, however, list four factors which should be considered
in determining if an area warrant should issue:
(i) the frequency with which aliens illegally in the country are known
or reasonably believed to be transported within a particular area; (ii)
the proximity of the area in question to the border; (iii) the extensiveness and geographic characteristics of the area, including the roads
therein and the extent of their use, and (iv) the probable degree of
interference with the ights of innocent persons, taking into account
the scope of the proposed search, its duration, and the concentration
of illegal alien traffic in relation to the general traffic of the road or
29
area.
Justice White, dissenting,"0 agreed to the constitutionality of an area
vehicle may contain aliens who are illegally in the country, he may stop the car
briefly and investigate the circumstances that provoke suspicion. As in Terry, the
stop and inquiry must be "reasonably related in scope to the justification for their
initiation." 392 U.S. at 29. The officer may question the driver and passengers
about their citizenship and immigration status, and he may ask them to explain suspicious circumstances, but any further detention or search must be based on consent
or probable cause.
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881-82 (1975). See also id. at 883. But
see id. at 888-90 (Douglas, I., concurring).
26. Perhaps the decisive factor in determining when the Camarawarrant procedure is
applicable to a border search is the extent to which the search is "personal in nature"
(degree of intrusiveness) or "aimed at the discovery of evidence of a crime" (as opposed
to an administrative inquiry). Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967).
Camara expressly distinguished between a health official, undertaking an inspection for
the purpose of finding violations of the housing code, and "'one. .. who would search
for the fruits or instrumentalities of a crime.'" 387 U.S. at 538, quoting Frank v.
Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 383 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting), overruled, Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). Justice Powell in Almeida-Sanchez accepted the
Government's contention that roving Border Patrol searches "are undertaken primarily
for administrative rather than prosecutorial purposes," noting that only 3 percent of the
aliens who are apprehended in the United States are prosecuted (413 U.S. at 278), and
that violators of the housing code in Camarawere similarly subject to criminal penalties.
Id. at 279. However, Justice Powell did not discuss the apprehension of the aliens
themselves, as "fruits or instrumentalities of a crime," or the importance of roving Border
Patrol searches in apprehending customs violators. A further distinction is that the
crime of alien smuggling, which is the basis for most constitutional challenges to Border
Patrol searches, carries much heavier penalties than does the typical housing code
violation.
27. 413 U.S. at 283-84.
28. Id. at 283.
29. Id. at 283-84.
30. Id. at 285. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist joined in
Justice White's opinion.
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For White, the problem

confronting the Court
center[ed] on . . .roving patrol[s] operating away from, but near, the
border. These patrols may search for aliens without a warrant if there
is probable cause to believe that the vehicle searched is carrying aliens
illegally into the country. 31
Under the circumstances of the case, White stated he would uphold

the search even without a warrant or probable cause.3 2 Relying on the
general proposition that the fourth amendment only requires that
searches be reasonable, White would have upheld the searches under the

broad statutory power given the Border Patrol, 3 which, reflecting
congressional intent, indicated that the searches would in fact be reasonable.34
B.
Martinez-Fuerte

5

Martinez-Fuerte

was convicted by the United States District Court

31. Id. at 288.
32. Id. If probable cause existed for the search of a particular vehicle, no warrant
would be necessary under Carroll. Therefore, the area warrant would be useful only in
a situation where there is less than probable cause to search a particular vehicle. Justice
Powell's concurring opinion failed to note probable cause as a requirement for an area
warrant, stating that the issuance of such a warrant may be based upon a "constitutionally adequate equivalent of probable cause." Id. at 279. An examination of the
Camaradecision reveals the following language: "If a valid public interest justifies the
intrusion contemplated, then there is probable cause to issue a suitably restricted search
warrant." 387 U.S. at 539. A "valid public interest," therefore, may be the "constitutionally adequate equivalent of probable cause." Query whether the valid public interest in apprehending murderers, rapists, or drug dealers authorizes the issuance
of area warrants for particular parts of an urban area.
33. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) (1970) provides in part:
Any officer or employee of the [Immigration and Naturalization] Service authorized under regulations prescribed by the Attorney General shall have power without
warrant(3) within a reasonable distance from any external boundary of the United States,
to board and search for aliens any . . . vehicle, and within a distance of twentyfive miles from any such external boundary to have access to private lands, but not
dwellings, for the purposes of patrolling the border to prevent the illegal entry of
aliens into the United States ....
34. 413 U.S. at 293, 294.
35. The action was consolidated for decision with two other appeals. The first
involved Jiminez-Garcia who was stopped and detained at the San Clemente, California,
checkpoint. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 514 F.2d 308, 310 (9th Cir.), cert.
granted, 96 S.Ct. 35 (1975); see note 37 infra. Like Martinez-Fuerte, Jiminez-Garcia
was charged with violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (2) (1970) (see note 36 infra), and
of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1970), for conspiracy to transport an "illegal alien." At his trial,
he made a motion to suppress which was granted. 514 F.2d at 310.
The second appeal was brought by the government after a motion to suppress was
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for transporting illegal aliens into the United States. 6 He was stopped
at a highway checkpoint located near San Clemente, California,3 7 pursuant to a warrant issued by a United States Magistrate.3 8 This warrant
was issued on the finding of "'probable cause' to believe that mass
violations of the Immigration laws' were and are being committed at the
checkpoint.3 9 The warrant commanded the Border Patrol to conduct an
granted in the case of another defendant, Guillen. Id. Guillen's car was stopped at the
San Clemente checkpoint where agents found that his two passengers as well as three
persons concealed in the trunk were illegal aliens. Guillen was charged with inducing
the illegal entry of aliens in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (4) (1970), and 18 U.S.C.
§ 371 (1970). 514 F.2d at 310.
36. 514 F.2d at 309. Martinez-Fuerte was convicted of violating 8 U.S.C. §
1324(a) (2) (1970) which provides in part:
(a) Any person, including the owner, operator, pilot, master, commanding officer,
agent or consignee of any means of transportation who(2) knowing that he is in the United States in violation of law, and knowing
or having reasonable grounds to believe that his last entry into the United States
occurred less than three years prior thereto, transports, or moves, or attempts to
transport or move, within the United States by means of transportation or otherwise, in furtherance of such violation of law;
any alien, . . . not duly admitted by an immigration officer or not lawfully entitled to enter or reside within the United States . . . shall be guilty of a
felony ....

37. The checkpoint was characterized by the Immigration and Naturalization Service,
the Martinez-Fuerte court noted, as a permanent fixed checkpoint. 514 F.2d at 312. It
is located about five miles south of San Clemente on Interstate 5, which is the major
highway connecting Los Angeles and San Diego. According to the court, "[wihen in
operation, the checkpoint operates as a roadblock causing all northbound vehicles. . . to
slow or come to at least a 'fleeting stop' for an immigration check." Id. The check
which is made at this point is based solely upon the discretion of the Border Patrol agent
who looks into each car as it passes. If that agent's suspicion is aroused he may divert
the vehicle to a secondary inspection area where the occupants will be questioned as to
their citizenship or immigration status. Id. at 313.
38. Id. at 310. The warrant directed the Border Patrol to do the following:
(1) to conduct an immigration traffic checkpoint on the northbound lanes of Interstate Route 5, five miles south of San Clemente, California, and;
(2) to stop northbound motor vehicles for the purpose of making routine inquiries to determine the nationality and/or immigration status of the occupants of
said vehicles, and;
(3) to conduct a routine inspection of said vehicles for the presence of aliens,
and;
(4) since the flow of alien traffic occurs at all hours of the day, and since limited operation of the traffic checkpoint would tend to defeat its purpose, the operation of this checkpoint may be conducted at any time of day or night ....
Id. at 311 n.2. The warrant was issued upon the magistrate's finding of "probable cause
have
to believe that mass violations of the Immigration laws of the United States ...
been and are being committed.

. . "

Id.

39. The warrant was a temporary warrant issued on June 22, 1974 for a period of 10
days. However, it was renewed 26 times for additional 10 day periods, thus prompting
the court to observe "[tihe particular warrant before us . . . was simply the first
installment in what appears to be a perpetual succession of similar warrants." Id. at 312.
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immigration traffic checkpoint, authorizing them to check the immigration status of occupants of vehicles traveling the interstate highway
leading from the Mexican border to the United States. 40 The Government had "stipulated that there was neither probable cause nor founded
suspicion for the stop." 41 Martinez-Fuerte moved to suppress testimony
based on observations made at the checkpoint "on the grounds that the
stop was made without founded suspicion, probable cause or [a] valid
warrant." 42
In sustaining his contention, the court rejected both the use of the
area warrant as a justification for inspection stops, 43 and also the
analogy set forth by Justice Powell in Almeida-Sanchez between the
44
justification'for area warrants and administrative inspection searches.
The court found that a stop, even if it can be characterized as a "fleeting
stop" is subject to fourth amendment protections.4 5
In finding that the warrant did not legitimize the checkpoint operations, the court relied on principles announced in Carroll v. United
States:46
[Tlhose lawfully within the country, entitled to use the public highways,
have a right to free passage without interruption or search unless there
is known to a compentent official authorized to search, probable cause
for believing that their vehicles are carrying contraband [,] illegal mer47
chandise [,or illegal aliens].
The Martinez-Fuerte court reasoned that despite the existence of a
warrant issued on conclusory allegations of probable cause, there must
be "specific and articulable facts" which would justify stopping a car in
each case." 48 Additionally, although recognizing that "the standard of
probable cause may in some cases be a flexible one, '40 the court stated
that where an area warrant is issued on a blanket conclusion of probable
The court also noted that the "inspection" which was authorized by paragraph 3 (see
note 38 supra) of the warrant was a euphemism used by the Border 'Patrol for "searches."
514 F.2d at 311 n.3.
40. It is clear that routine stops at the San Clemente checkpoint require a minimal
showing of founded suspicion. United States v. Juarez-Rodriguez, 498 F.2d 7 (9th Cir.
1974). See note 2 supra; note 79 infra.
41. 514 F.2d at 312.
42. Id. at 310.
43. Id. at 314-16.
44. Id. at 316-22.
45. Id. at 315.
46. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
47. Id. at 154.
48. 514 F.2d at 315.
49. Id. at 316.
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cause neither the constitutional safeguard of a warrant "particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be

seized," 50 nor the intermediate protection by a magistrate conducting an
independent inquiry into the facts surrounding each particular intrusion

is satisfied.51
Since the warrant was properly found unconstitutional given its lack
of standards or guidelines to control the executing officer's discretion, 52

the court need not have determined whether the utilization of an area
warrant was constitutionally impermissible.

The court held, however,

that a warrant, even if properly drawn, would not justify a stop by either
a roving patrol or by Border Patrol agents at a fixed checkpoint.
The court focused its attention on an examination of the rationale
relied upon by Justice Powell. The Government argued that the administrative inspection doctrine, which authorizes warrantless administrative

inspections of those involved in activities closely regulated by the government, 53 should be broadened to authorize the conduct of inspections

at the San Clemente checkpoint pursuant to a generalized area warrant.
In rejecting this argument, the Ninth Circuit distinguished Camara on
two grounds. First, the court indicated that the Government failed to

make an adequate showing of necessity to justify the need for the
warrant and the procedures it authorized. 54 Although recognizing the

limitations of any possible solutions given the magnitude of the problem,
the court stated that "the mere fact that protecting a constitutional right
50. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
51. 514 F.2d at 316.
52. In order to satisfy constitutional requirements, a search warrant must be drawn so
that nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant. See Marron v.
United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927); United States v. Sanchez, 509 F.2d 886, 889
(6th Cir. 1975). The role played by the federal magistrate is to perform the task of a
neutral and detached reviewer of the application for the warrant, and not to perform as a
mere rubber stamp for the party seeking the warrant. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
514 F.2d 308, 316 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 96 S.Ct. 35 (1975), citing Aguilar v. Texas,
378 U.S. 108, 111 (1964). See note 64 infra.
53. See cases cited in note 20 supra.
54. 514 F.2d at 318-19. In noting that the United States had not exhausted the
alternatives available to deal with the illegal alien problem, the court made some
suggestions as to how to deal with the problem. Among them were intensification of
border searches by additional manpower; destroying the economic appeal of illegal alien
labor by congressional action to impose sanctions on those employers who employ illegal
aliens (see DeCanas v. Bica, 96 S. Ct. 933 (1976); elimination of temporary border
passes; and elimination of the "commuter system" which allows Mexican nationals to
come into the United States to work and then return to Mexico after the working day.
514 F.2d at 319.
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will impose a heavy burden on the federal fisc is not a proper ground
for our failing to protect that right." '
Second, the warrant in Camara authorized administrative inspections

for housing code violations and not criminal investigations like those
which occur at the checkpoint.5 6 In Camara,the Supreme Court stated
that the most effective way to insure compliance with building standards
in the municipal codes was through periodic inspections of all structures
located in a particular area. 57 Yet, a routine check of automobiles
passing through a fixed checkpoint can hardly be considered "administrative" under the Camara rationale. The two types of "inspections" are
for fundamentally different purposes. The inspection of houses for
potential building code violations does not serve the criminal enforcement purposes that are inherent in the stopping of vehicles to determine
if aliens are being brought unlawfully into the country. 8 As the court
noted:
That the border patrol checkpoint operations are both personal in nature
and aimed at the discovery of evidence of a crime is beyond dispute.
Inherent in the government's argument here, and in its argument in Almeida . . .is the fallacy that its practice of simply deporting aliens
rather than prosecuting them gives its operations a quasi-administrative
aspect. Although most aliens are simply deported, it is nonetheless true
that the government does seek to prosecute virtually all smugglers of illegal aliens. . . . Furthermore, border patrol agents are armed with
service revolvers. . . . They are law enforcement officers and cannot
rationally be viewed as administrative personnel.50
The court then considered whether, assuming Justice Powell was
correct, the warrant met the minimum standards outlined by him. In
finding that it did not, the court noted, first, that "the frequency with
which illegal aliens pass through the San Clemente checkpoint is far too
55. 514 F.2d at 318-19.
56. Id. at 319.
57. 387 U.S. at 535-36. The Supreme Court justified upholding the area warrants on

the grounds that:
First, such programs have a long history of judicial and public acceptance....
Second, the public interest demands that all dangerous conditions be prevented or
abated, yet it is doubtful that any other canvassing technique would achieve acceptable results. Many such conditions-faulty wiring is an obvious example-are not
observable from outside the building and indeed may not be apparent to the inexpert
occupant himself. Finally, because the inspections are neither personal in nature
nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of crime, they involve a relatively limited
invasion of the urban citizen's privacy.
id. at 537.
58. See Note, Area Search Warrantsin Border Zones: Almeida-Sanchez and Camara,
84YALE L...
355, 365-67 (1974).
59. 514 F.2d at 320.
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low to make operation of a checkpoint reasonable."60 Second, the
checkpoint was located too far from the border to come within Powell's
notion that the warrant could be issued to cover an area "reasonably
near the border."'
Third, the geographic characteristics of the check-

point area did not establish a nexus with the border.6 2 Finally, the
degree of interference with the rights of innocent persons occasioned by

the checkpoint procedures was "intolerable." 63 Additionally, the court
did not fail to note that the issuance of the warrant, without there having
been probable cause or founded suspicion, gave the border agents

"unfettered discretion to stop any or all cars and to divert them for
64
detention and questioning."

Judge Carter, dissenting, stated that "[tihe four dissenters in Almeida-Sanchez would have upheld a warrantless search by roving patrols on

less than probable cause.

Clearly, they would uphold a fixed check-

point procedure pursuant to a 'checkpoint' warrant."6

He then disa-

60. Id. at 321. The majority stated that "only .12% of the passing cars were
found to contain 'illegal' aliens." Id. Judge Carter, in his dissent, disputed this statistic
with his own finding that aliens were found to be present in about 21 percent of the
vehicles stopped. This led him to conclude that the fruitfulness of the searches will
increase as more cars are inspected. Id. at 325.
61. Id. at 321-22. See text at notes 79-80 infra.
62. 514 F.2d at 322.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 321. In this regard, the court compared the issuance of the warrants to the
"writs of assistance" which precipitated the Revolutionary War. Id. at 320-21. The court
explained:
The primary vices of the writs of assistance .. .were (1) that the warrants could
be issued without sufficient cause; (2) that persons and places were not particularly
specified; and (3) that the warrants left too much to the discretion of the bearer.
The unmistakably parallel vice of the inspection warrant for the San Clemente
checkpoint is that, without having issued on probable cause-or even founded suspicion-focussed on any particular person or vehicle, the warrant purports to authorize agents to do that which they clearly could not do without the warrant: namely,
to stop vehicles without cause or founded suspicion.
Id. (footnote omitted).
65. Id. at 323. Judge Carter stated that although the majority correctly stated the
issues presented by the appeal, they failed to take cognizance of the fact that the views
expressed by Powell in Almeida-Sanchez were supported by a majority of the Court:
The most interesting aspect of the majority opinion is its references to Justice Powell's concurrence in Almeida-Sanchez. The opinion reads as if Justice Powell stood
alone in his views as to the validity of an area warrant. Whether or not Justice
Powell was correct in his views is one question, but a breakdown of the votes in
Alneida-Sanchez indicates that his views were supported by a majority of the Court.
We concede that Justice Powell's concurrence did not involve fixed checkpoints.
Id. at 323 (Carter, J., dissenting). After referring to footnote 3 of the majority opinion
in Almeida-Sanchez (413 U.S. at 270 n.3: "The Justices who join this opinion are
divided upon the question of the constitutionality of area search warrants such as
described in Mr. Justice Powell's concurring opinion."), Judge Carter stated: "I specu-
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greed with the view of the Martinez-Fuerte majority that Powell's analogy could not be accepted and concluded that a majority of the Supreme
Court would uphold the warrant in question. Although recognizing
that the fixed checkpoint at San Clemente might be too far removed
from the border to qualify under Justice Powell's standards, Carter
attempted nevertheless to justify the application of the warrant to the
checkpoint as being reasonable.6" He sought to demonstrate that the
stop and possible search at a fixed checkpoint was less intrusive than the
67
type of intrusion occasioned by a roving border patrol.
He first premised his argument on the fact that roving patrols often
stop individuals in "rural, unlighted area[s]." He continued:
If people could be stopped at any time by roving patrol cars, without any
notice, then clearly the area in which such stops could occur should be
limited to an area quite close to the border, where very few residences
or travelers could be found. The same purpose is achieved, however,
by a fixed checkpoint which limits the area of possible search to a
5
small, permanent portion of a single road.
Such an argument, however, seems to misconceive the inherent differences between a roving patrol and a fixed checkpoint. It would seem
that while the warrant might be valid as to open areas where there is less
likelihood of stopping innocent citizens, such justification is lacking at a
fixed checkpoint located on the main highway between two major cities.
Second, Carter emphasized that no search was involved in two of the
three cases before the court.6 9 In an attempt to show the limitations of
the use of the warrant in question, Carter pointed out that the MartinezFuerte majority had itself limited its holding to "stops, diversion and
interrogation. ' 70 Since Justice Powell had referred to "'roving vehicular searches,' ,71 'Carter implied that because a stop at a fixed checkpoint
late that had only Justice Powell been of the view expressed, the footnote would have
been unnecessary." 514 F.2d at 323. Carter concluded that
Justice Powell's concurrence in Almeida-Sanchez, when read together with Justice
White's dissent, supports the legality of the stop, limited visual inspection, and occasional interrogation of motorists at a fixed checkpoint, pursuant to a warrant issued
by a "neutral and detached magistrate" involved in these cases.
Id.
66. 514 F.2d at 324.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See note 35 supra.
70. 514 F.2d at 324.
71. Id. Judge Carter quoted the following statement by Justice Powell in Altneida.
Sanchez:
"The conjunction of these factors-consistent judicial approval, absence of a reasonable alternative for the solution of a serious problem, and only a modest intrusion
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is far less intrusive than the stop and possible search by a roving border

72
patrol, Powell would uphold the two convictions under consideration.

In view of the fact that Powell had implicitly indicated that a stop
need not be based on a warrant, 73 Carter failed to explain why, as to the
two cases where only a stop occurred, a warrant was needed. Indeed,
he noted 74 the holdings of two other circuits, 75 as well as the implication
of a prior Ninth Circuit case, 76 that indicate that a warrantless stop at a

fixed checkpoint is constitutionally permissible.
C.

Constitutionalityand Necessity of Area Search Warrants

The Supreme Court has not decided whether a stop, with or without a
warrant, or with or without probable cause is permissible at a fixed

checkpoint. 77 Martinez-Fuerte seems to give the Court the opportuon those whose automobiles are searched-persuades me that under appropriate limiting circumstances there may exist a constitutionally adequate equivalent of probable cause to conduct roving vehicular searches in border areas."
Id. at 323, quoting Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 279 (Powell, J.,
concurring) (emphasis by Judge Carter). As to the concept of "a constitutionally
adequate equivalent of probable cause" see note 32 supra.
72. See note 35 supra.
73. See note 25 supra and accompanying text; notes 83-84 infra and accompanying
text.
74. 514 F.2d at 324.
75. Carter cited United States v. Hart, 506 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1975) and United
States v. Bowman, 487 F.2d 1229 (10th Cir. 1973). In Hart, however, the Fifth Circuit
court had held that a fixed checkpoint was the functional equivalent of a border,
and thus not only a stop would be constitutionally permissible, but also a search
would be constitutionally permissible even without probable cause. See note 16 supra. In
Boowman, the defendant was stopped after officers detected odors of marijuana, and thus
the stop was unrelated to the issue of whether the defendant was smuggling illegal aliens.
76. United States v. Evans, 507 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1974). There, the Ninth Circuit
held that the diversion of a car did not violate any constitutionally protected expectation
of the right to privacy. The automobile, which had been waved through an immigration
checkpoint at Oak Grove, California, contained two individuals of Mexican descent lying
in plain view on the floor of the car behind the front seat. As a result of the
observation, the car was pursued, stopped, and searched which resulted in the apprehension of two illegal aliens.
In a per curiam opinion, the court held that the stop was not made in violation of the
standards of Almeida-Sanchez because the agent saw only what was in plain view and
from such observation was able to formulate probable cause to justify the stop. Id. at
880. Further, the court summarily rejected the defense argument that diversion of the
automobile through the checkpoint violated the defendant's constitutionally protected
expectation of privacy. Id. From this, Carter concluded that "[slurely, if a diversion
of a car through a checkpoint was not illegal, the slowing of cars at a checkpoint would
also not be illegal." 514 F.2d at 324.
77. United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 897 n.3 (1975). There the Court stated that
under the facts of the case it
need not decide whether checkpoints and roving patrols must be treated the same
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nity to clarify its previous holdings and determine whether the same

rules apply to a stop at a fixed checkpoint.
Additionally, the Court, for the first time, will be able to pass judg-

ment on what constitutes a properly drawn area warrant, and the area
for which it may be issued. As to this latter point, it is clear from
Almeida-Sanchez that at least five Justices would uphold as constitution-

al a properly drawn area warrant,s but there is some question as to
whether such a warrant would have to be limited in scope to only those
areas reasonably near the border. In Almeida-Sanchez, the search was

conducted at a location approximately 25 air miles from the border. In
discussing the inconvenience to the Government in having to first

obtain a warrant, Powell's statement that it would be feasible "for the
Border Patrol to obtain advance judicial approval," was limited to
"roving searches on a particularroad or roads for a reasonable period of

time. 179 Justice White also indicated that the application of the warrant
might be limited to roving patrols operating near the border.80 If these
statements can be taken as intimating that a warrant could properly
issue only for those areas reasonably near a border and for a reasonable
period of time, it would seem clear that the warrant in Martinez-Fuerte
would have to fail on both grounds.

The Court has given little indication as to what constitutes a properly
drawn warrant, except for Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Almeifor all purposes, or whether Border Patrol officers may lawfully stop motorists for
questioning at an established checkpoint without reason to believe that a particular
vehicle is carrying aliens.
See also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 n.9 (1975).
78. The five Justices are Justice Powell, and the three dissenters joining in Justice
White's opinion. It would seem, however, that at least one of the Justices in the majority
also would uphold the constitutionality of an area warrant. See 413 U.S. at 270 n.3;
note 65 supra.
79. 413 U.S. at 283 (emphasis added). In Brignoni-Ponce, Powell, writing for the
majority, specifically declined to consider "whether a warrant could be issued to stop cars
in a designated area on the basis of conditions in the area as a whole and in the absence
of reason to suspect that any particular car is carrying aliens." 422 U.S. at 882 n.7.
It should be noted, however, that although the search in Brignoni-Ponce occurred
near the San Clemente checkpoint, the Court viewed the search as having been conducted
by a roving patrol.
In United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975), the search occurred at a fixed
checkpoint away from the border, and no mention was made in the opinion as to the
validity of an area search warrant. Given this and the first two factors that Powell
stated must be considered in issuing a warrant (see text accompanying note 29 supra), it
is possible that the warrant would have to be limited in its application to an area closer
to the border than a fixed checkpoint, like San Clemente, which is located some distance
from the border and separated by major roads and cities. This should be so notwithstanding that Ortiz holds that for purposes of probable cause to search there is no
difference between a checkpoint and roving patrols.
80. 413 U.S. at 288. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
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da-Sanchez where he listed four factors that should be taken into
account by an issuing magistrate."' These factors, however, would not

in themselves seem sufficient to establish the requisite probable cause
needed for the issuance of the warrant, without specific facts tending to
establish each of the four factors. Thus, the Border Patrol should be
which
required to produce facts, taken from past stops and searches,
82
would show a basis for inferring the existence of the four factors.
It also has been intimated that a stop at a fixed checkpoint, without a
s3
warrant or probable cause, might also be constitutionally permissible.
The Court has often pointed to the difference in nature between a stop
at a fixed checkpoint and a stop by a roving border patrol. A stop at a
fixed checkpoint is preceded by notice, occurs on an open highway
where many motorists are present during the course of the stop, and
presents few of the intimidating and frightening aspects of a stop on
a rural desolate road. 4
A justification for stops at fixed checkpoints also may be found in
81. See text accompanying note 29 supra.
82. In Brignoni-Ponce,Powell indicated that
the nature of illegal alien traffic and the characteristics of smuggling operations
tend to generate articulable grounds for identifying violators.
422 U.S. at 883. A number of factors which may be considered by the issuing
magistrate are noted at id. at 884-86. See also United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 897
(1975). In his dissenting opinion in Martinez-Fuerte, Judge Carter indicated that the
warrant in question had been issued on the basis of the record in United States v. Baca,
368 F. Supp. 398 (S.D. Cal. 1973), thereby indicating that the Government, in seeking
the warrant, had relied in part on a compilation of those facts which would tend to
establish the four factors outlined by Powell. 514 F.2d at 324.
83. In Brignoni-Ponce,even though they were dealing with a roving patrol, the Court
held that "when an officer's observations lead him reasonably to suspect that a particular
vehicle may contain aliens who are illegally in the country, he may stop the car briefly
and investigate the circumstances that provoke suspicion." 422 U.S. at 882. Powell
went on to state that a reasonable suspicion must exist to justify a roving patrol stop, and
thereby left open the question of whether a stop at a fixed checkpoint without prior
reasonable suspicion would be permissible. Id. In Ortiz, Powell stated that a stop at a
fixed checkpoint unlike that of a roving patrol is far less intrusive. 422 U.S. at 894.
Further, in Ortiz, Justice Rehnquist thought that
the Court's opinion is confined to full searches, and does not extend to fixed-checkpoint stops for the purpose of inquiring about citizenship. Such stops involve only
a modest intrusion, are not likely to be frightening or significantly annoying, are
regularized by the fixed situs, and effectively serve the important national interest
in controlling illegal entry. I do not regard such stops as unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment, whether or not accompanied by "reasonable suspicion" that a
particular vehicle is involved in immigration violations, . . . and I do not understand today's opinion to cast doubt upon their constitutionality.
422 U.S. at 898-99 (Rehnquist, J.,concurring). See also United States v. Evans, 507
F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1974); note 76 supra.
Compare these principles with those used by the Ninth Circuit in applying its founded
suspicion doctrine. See note 2 supra.
84. United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 894-95 (1975).
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congressional intent underlying the enactment of the immigration and

naturalization laws. For example, Congress has indicated that it is
"in the best interest of the nation to limit the number of persons
who can legally immigrate into the country in any given year."85 The
primary purpose behind these policies is the congressional desire to

protect the American labor market from competition resulting from a
great number of foreign laborers.8" Clearly, by establishing fixed numbers of those who can lawfully immigrate, the congressional intent is
undermined if the labor market is flooded by those illegally in the
country. One possible solution to the problem of maintaining effective
enforcement of the immigration laws, while accounting for each individ-

ual's constitutional rights, would be for the Court to include stops at a
fixed checkpoint within the meaning of a "functional equivalent of a

border.

'87

These stops would afford Border Patrol agents the needed

time to ascertain whether there exists probable cause to further detain

the individual, which in turn might provide probable cause to conduct a
search.88

Although it is clear that a grave problem exists in enforcing the
immigration laws, the Court might be limited in its ability to effectuate a
lasting and workable remedy. Ultimately, the problem is best left for
Congress to resolve, perhaps by enacting legislation that removes the
incentive for mass, unlawful immigration into the country. s

Neverthe-

less, the Court should not hesitate to take the opportunity to establish
standards and guidelines until Congress should deem it necessary to so
act.
85. United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398, 402 (S.D. Cal. 1973); United States v.
Morgan, 501 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Esquer-Rivera, 500 F.2d 313
(9th Cir. 1974).
86. United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398, 402 (S.D. Cal. 1973).
87. This view has been accepted by at least one circuit. See United States v. Hart,
506 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1975); note 16 supra.
88. As used in the text, a "detention" at the checkpoint would not be confined to the
mere asking of .the citizenship or immigration status of the occupants of the vehicle;
presumably this would be part of the stop itself. Rather, once the stop has occurred, if
there is probable cause or reasonable suspicion that the occupants of the vehicle are
either "smuggling" illegal aliens, or are themselves illegally in the country, the Border
Patrol agent could then "detain" the vehicle for more extensive questioning which in turn
might give rise to probable cause to conduct a search.
89. See generally United States v. Ortiz, 422 'U.S. 891, 900 (1975) (Burger, C.3.,
concurring). The actions which Congress could take include comprehensive legislation
directed toward the employer of illegal aliens. See DeCanas v. Bica, 96 S. Ct. 933
(1976). Such legislation could also include, as a possible means of enforcement, a
reporting provision similar to that contained in the Internal Revenue Code. INT. REv.
CODE OF 1954, § 7623.

